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_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2:07-cv-01045) 
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
_____________ 
Argued October 1, 2012 
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(Opinion Filed: January 14, 2013) 
 
Thomas A. Leonard, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Richard P. Limburg, Esq. 
H. David Seidman, Esq. 
Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel LLP 
One Penn Center, 19th Floor 
1617 John F. Kenney Blvd. 
Philadelphia, PA 19103-1895 
 
Counsel for Appellant, CMR D.N. Corp. and Marina 
Towers Ltd., t/a Waterfront Renaissance Associates, 
LLP 
 
City of Philadelphia Law Department 
Shelley R. Smith, Esq., City Solicitor 
Jane Lovitch Istvan, Esq. [ARGUED] 
1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1595 
 
Counsel for Appellees, The City of Philadelphia, Brian 
Abernathy, Philadelphia City Planning Commission, 
and Philadelphia City Council 
 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
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 Waterfront Renaissance Associates, LLP 
(―Waterfront‖) owns a lot in the Delaware River waterfront 
neighborhood of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  For almost 
twenty years, Waterfront pursued the development of a large 
commercial and residential real estate project on this lot.  In 
2006 the City of Philadelphia (―City‖) enacted an ordinance 
that extended certain construction restrictions from a nearby 
neighborhood to most lots within the area known as the 
Central Riverfront District, including Waterfront‘s property.  
Asserting that the construction height restriction imposed by 
the extension foreclosed its development plans, Waterfront 
sued.   
 
In 2010, however, the City rescinded the application of 
the height restriction to Waterfront‘s property.  The City then 
sought to dismiss Waterfront‘s constitutional claims based on 
the height restriction as moot, and moved for summary 
judgment on all other claims.  Waterfront opposed these 
motions and, to avoid the mootness problem, sought leave to 
amend its complaint to challenge as unconstitutional a width 
restriction that had also been extended by the 2006 ordinance 
but had not been rescinded in 2010.  Waterfront also sought 
to add a claim that an ordinance enacted in 2009, which had 
imposed additional requirements on construction along the 
Central Delaware River waterfront, was unconstitutional. 
 
 At issue in this appeal are the District Court‘s rulings 
on these motions.  The District Court held that the rescission 
of the height restriction mooted Waterfront‘s federal 
constitutional claims against the 2006 ordinance, denied 
Waterfront‘s motion to further amend its complaint to attack 
the width restriction, and granted summary judgment for the 
4 
City on all other claims, including those based on the 2009 
ordinance.   
 
For the reasons that follow, we find no reason to 
disturb any of the District Court‘s rulings.  We will, therefore, 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
I. Factual Background 
A. The Initial Stages of Waterfront’s World 
Trade Center Project 
 The key facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute.  
The origins of this protracted controversy can be traced to 
1987, when Waterfront purchased a 5.3-acre lot (the ―Site‖) 
to develop a high-rise project (the ―Project‖) in the Central 
Riverfront District of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The Site is 
located at the southwest corner of Delaware Avenue (now 
known as Columbus Boulevard) and Noble Street. 
 
Waterfront pursued the development of the Project 
over the next several years.  In 1988, with the support of a 
recommendation letter from Philadelphia Mayor Wilson 
Goode, Waterfront obtained an exclusive license to develop 
its Project as a World Trade Center-type development.  At the 
time of Waterfront‘s purchase, the Site was zoned G-2 
industrial.  Consequently, Waterfront worked with the 
Philadelphia City Planning Commission (―Planning 
Commission‖) to obtain rezoning of the Site.  The Planning 
Commission is the Philadelphia agency empowered to 
propose zoning ordinances to the Philadelphia City Council 
(―City Council‖), and is required by law to make 
recommendations to the Mayor for transmission to the City 
Council on any matters that may affect zoning.  See 351 PA. 
5 
CODE §§ 4.4-601, 4.4-604 (Supp. 2012).  The Planning 
Commission agreed to support Waterfront‘s request to rezone 
the Site C-4 commercial, a permissive designation that would 
allow Waterfront to build a mixed-use, high-rise project.  In 
exchange, Waterfront agreed to enter into a series of 
restrictive zoning covenants with certain civic associations to 
govern any construction on the Site.  In 1989, per the 
Planning Commission‘s recommendation, the City Council 
rezoned the Site C-4 commercial, and Waterfront 
subsequently entered into the required covenants.   
 
Waterfront also explored ways to finance the World 
Trade Center Project, including forming a committee with the 
City and several business associations to analyze the Project‘s 
feasibility, and entering into a partnership with the Delaware 
River Port Authority to develop a plan for construction 
financed in part by the Port Authority.
1
    
 
When financing for the project became a concrete 
possibility in early 2005, Waterfront obtained a permit from 
the City‘s Department of Licenses & Inspections, the agency 
with actual authority to issue building permits, see 351 PA. 
CODE § 5.5-1002 (the ―Licensing Department‖), that allowed 
demolishing existing structures on the Site and constructing a 
28-story apartment tower upon the issuance of a building 
                                              
1
 The Port Authority, a public organization wholly 
independent from the City, was created by an interstate 
compact between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the 
State of New Jersey and is charged with maintaining and 
operating the Philadelphia-Camden port.  See 36 PA. STAT. 
ANN. § 3503 (West 2012). 
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permit.
2
  Waterfront also entered into a financing agreement 
with a major bank, with a loan closing date of January 2006 
and a construction start date of February 2006.  
Unfortunately, however, Waterfront had to postpone 
construction so it could rework the financing due to rising 
costs.   
 
B. The March 2006 Ordinance  
The loan scheduled to close in early 2006 was the 
closest Waterfront would get to the development of its 
Project.  On March 16, 2006, the City enacted a zoning 
ordinance (the ―March 2006 Ordinance‖) that extended to 
certain areas of the Central Riverfront District, including 
Waterfront‘s Site, a zoning overlay known as the ―Old City 
Residential Area Special District Controls‖ (the ―Old City 
Overlay‖).  See R. 578.  The Old City Overlay included a 
building height restriction of 65 feet, as well as a width 
restriction of 70 feet.  See PHILADELPHIA, PA., ZONING CODE 
                                              
2
 Waterfront states that it obtained an ―as-of-right‖ zoning 
permit for a 26-story apartment tower in May of 2005 but 
cites to a permit in the record that relocated lot lines, and was 
issued in March of 2006.  See Appellant‘s Br. at 13 (citing R. 
1372); see also R. 706 (Waterfront‘s counterstatement of 
facts in opposition to the City‘s motion for summary 
judgment incorrectly stating that the permit found at R. 1372 
was issued on March 3, 2005).  The March 3, 2005 permit can 
be found at R. 571 but the record contains no permit issued in 
May of 2005.  Regardless, both the March 2005 and the 
March 2006 zoning permits required Waterfront to obtain an 
actual building permit before construction could begin.  See 
R. 571, 1372. 
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§ 14-1610(4), (5) (1990), repealed by Bill No. 110845 (Dec. 
22, 2011); R. 159-61.
3
 
 
Waterfront alleges that its Site was never intended to 
be included in the March 2006 Ordinance.  It alleges that City 
Councilman Frank DiCicco, whose jurisdiction includes the 
Site, admitted to Waterfront‘s attorney that the inclusion of 
the Site in the area covered by the March 2006 Ordinance was 
a ―mistake,‖ R. 682, and that Philadelphia Mayor John Street 
stated that he would not have signed the legislation had he 
known that the 65-foot height restriction applied to the Site.  
The City disputes Waterfront‘s characterization of these 
statements.  However, Waterfront asked Councilman DiCicco 
to repeal the inclusion of the Site from the extension of the 
Old City Overlay, but he refused.  Moreover, Waterfront 
never applied for, or was denied, a permit under the March 
2006 Ordinance, and it did not seek a variance.   
 
II. Procedural History 
A. Initial Stages of the Litigation 
On February 23, 2007, Waterfront sued the City, the 
Planning Commission, the City Council, City Councilman 
aide Brian Abernathy, three civic associations with which it 
had entered into zoning covenants, and certain members of 
                                              
3
 The parties cite the Philadelphia Zoning Code as it existed 
before it was repealed in 2011.  We use the citation shorthand 
―FORMER PHILA. CODE‖ to refer to pre-repeal Zoning Code 
sections.  Both old and new versions of the Code are available 
at http://www.amlegal.com/library/pa/philadelphia.shtml.  We 
also cite to the parties‘ reproduction in the record of the 
relevant code provisions when they are provided. 
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those associations, in state court.  The City removed the case 
to federal court on March 15, 2007.   
 
An amended complaint, filed in 2008, alleges fourteen 
counts of constitutional and state law claims, focusing on the 
fact that the March 2006 Ordinance ―impos[ed] a sixty-five 
foot (65‘) height restriction on [Waterfront‘s] Site.‖  R. 87 
(Compl. ¶ 5).
4
  Counts I through VIII are directed at the City.  
Count I seeks a declaratory judgment, claiming that the 
March 2006 Ordinance is ―defective‖ because the City ―did 
not at any time discuss or consider the effect that extending 
the 65‘ height restriction would have on the public and 
private objectives established for the Site,‖ and, therefore, the 
Site‘s inclusion within the ordinance was a ―product of 
mistake‖ and ―constitute[d] an instance of arbitrary and 
unreasonable zoning bearing no substantial relationship to the 
public health, safety, and welfare of the City and its 
inhabitants.‖  R. 111-13 (Compl. ¶¶ 148-63).  Count II seeks 
a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was ―procedurally 
invalid‖ because ―the newspaper advertising of the March 
2006 Ordinance was insufficient to put [Waterfront] on 
notice‖ that the City planned to enact the ordinance.  Id. 
¶¶ 165-70.  Counts III, IV, and VIII seek a variety of 
                                              
4
 Citations to the Complaint in the record on appeal are to the 
Third Amended Complaint, which was filed after the District 
Court allowed Waterfront an opportunity to amend in March 
of 2011.  See infra at Part II.C.  However, the Third Amended 
Complaint is identical in all material respects to the 
provisions of the Amended Complaint described in Part II-A 
of this opinion.  See Am. Compl., CMR D.N. Corp. & Marina 
Towers Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:07-cv-01045 (E.D. 
Pa. July 7, 2008), ECF No. 81. 
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remedies including injunctive relief and damages, based on 
state law claims of promissory estoppel, detrimental reliance, 
and unjust enrichment.  Id. ¶¶ 172-85, 187-95, 212-21.  Count 
V seeks a declaration that the ―application of the [March 2006 
Ordinance] to [Waterfront‘s] Site . . . deprives [Waterfront] of 
its constitutional right to substantive due process.‖  Id. ¶ 201.  
Count VI seeks a declaration that ―any application‖ of the 
March 2006 Ordinance ―to [Waterfront‘s] Site‖ violates 
Waterfront‘s ―constitutional right to equal protection‖ 
because the City had ―arbitrarily treated [Waterfront‘s] Site 
differently from other similarly situated C-4 sites . . . .‖  Id. 
¶¶ 203, 206.  Count VII seeks monetary damages for the 
alleged violations of due process and equal protection.  Id. ¶¶ 
208-210.
5
   
 
On March 31, 2008, the District Court dismissed the 
Planning Commission, the City Council, and Abernathy from 
the case.  The District Court also dismissed Counts II and V.  
It reasoned that those counts constituted ―as-applied‖ 
challenges to the height restriction because they attacked only 
the application of the ordinance to the Site.  Waterfront 
Renaissance Assocs. v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 
07-1045, 2008 WL 862705, at *6-8 n.15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 
2008) (―Waterfront I‖).  Therefore, the Court concluded, 
                                              
5
 Counts IX through XIV alleged various tort and contract 
claims against the civic associations, and certain of their 
individual members, that Waterfront sued.  Most of these 
claims were dismissed at the pleadings stage, and the District 
Court later granted summary judgment on all remaining 
claims against those defendants.  See CMR D.N. Corp. v. City 
of Philadelphia, 803 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  
Waterfront does not appeal the dismissal of these claims. 
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because Williamson County Regional Planning Commission 
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 192 (1985), as well as 
Taylor Investment Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 
1285, 1293-95 (3d Cir. 1993), require property owners 
asserting as-applied challenges to zoning ordinances to apply 
for a building permit or seek a variance before they may bring 
a claim, and because Waterfront had not met this requirement, 
those counts were unripe.  See id.  At the same time, the 
District Court rejected as ―unacceptable‖ the City‘s 
arguments that the equal protection claim, Count VI, 
constituted an as-applied challenge, and therefore refused to 
dismiss that claim.  Id. at * 8.  Accordingly, after Waterfront 
I, the only constitutional claims that remained against the City 
were Counts I, VI, and VII. 
 
Following a period of extensive discovery, Waterfront 
filed a second amended complaint on May 4, 2009, adding 
Count XV against the City.  See Second Am. Compl., CMR 
D.N. Corp. & Marina Towers Ltd. v. City of Phila., No. 2:07-
cv-01045 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2009), ECF No. 121.  Count XV 
alleges that ―the 65‘ height restriction was included in the 
March 2006 Ordinance solely for the improper, unlawful, and 
unconstitutional purpose of empowering unelected civic 
associations to control re-development‖ in the area it covered, 
and thus violated due process.  See R. 129 (Compl. ¶ 254).  
Count XV also alleges that ―[t]he height restriction . . . is 
unconstitutional because it effectively delegates land use and 
planning powers to non-governmental neighborhood 
associations. . . .‖  Id. ¶ 287.  On these theories, Count XV 
seeks a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction 
against the application of the March 2006 Ordinance as 
against all possible developers.  The District Court later 
denied the City‘s motion to dismiss this new count, rejecting, 
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inter alia, the City‘s argument that Count XV asserted an 
unripe as-applied challenge.  Waterfront Renaissance Assocs. 
v. City of Phila., 701 F. Supp. 2d 633, 642 (E.D. Pa. 2010) 
(―Waterfront II‖).  Neither Waterfront nor the City have 
appealed any of the District Court‘s rulings in Waterfront I or 
Waterfront II. 
 
B. The Central Delaware Riverfront Ordinance 
and the Rescission of the Height Restriction 
Alter the Course of the Litigation 
Subsequently, and while the litigation was pending, the 
City enacted two additional ordinances that altered the course 
of the lawsuit.  First, in 2009 the City Council enacted a new 
zoning ordinance entitled the ―Central Delaware Riverfront 
Overlay District‖ (the ―CRO‖).  See FORMER PHILA. CODE 
§ 14-1638 (2009); R. 416-21.  The CRO covered some of the 
same plots to which the Old City Overlay had been extended 
by the March 2006 Ordinance, including Waterfront‘s Site.  
See id. § 14-1638(3); R. 687-88.  The stated purpose of the 
CRO was to ―protect the existing characteristics of the built 
and natural environment that are essential to achieving the 
working guidelines of the Civic Vision . . . while a Master 
Plan for the area is developed.‖  Id. § 14-1638(1)(h).  The 
Civic Vision was a comprehensive plan for the development 
of the Central Riverfront District, commissioned in 2006 by 
Mayor John Street, and adopted in 2009 by the Planning 
Commission as a statement of desirable zoning goals for the 
district.  See id. § 14-1638(1)(a), (h).  To achieve its purpose 
of protecting the characteristics of the built area in the Central 
Riverfront District while a ―Master Plan‖ was developed, the 
CRO provides that an applicant for a zoning permit must first 
submit for approval a plan of development to the Planning 
12 
Commission.  The CRO instructs the Planning Commission to 
approve the plan within seventy-five days by determining 
whether the proposed construction would be ―appropriate in 
scale, density, character and use for the surrounding 
community.‖  Id. § 14-1638(12)(a).  The CRO contains an 
extensive list of prohibited building uses for the lots within 
the new overlay, as well as an extensive list of building 
requirements for new constructions.  See, e.g., id. §§ 14-
1638(4), (5), (7) (requiring certain uses in ground floors of 
some buildings, and recreational trails and setbacks for other 
constructions).  Finally, the CRO required the Planning 
Commission to issue regulations ―providing objective 
standards‖ for the review of plans of development.  Id. § 14-
1638(12)(a).  The Planning Commission issued such 
regulations on April 20, 2010 (the ―CRO Regulations‖).  See 
R. 912-16.  Neither the CRO nor the CRO Regulations define 
the phrase ―appropriate in scale, density, character and use for 
the surrounding community.‖ 
 
Soon after the Regulations were issued, Waterfront 
moved under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
for leave to amend its complaint to add a Count XVI, 
asserting that the CRO and the CRO Regulations ―[o]n their 
face . . . violate the constitutional principles of separation of 
powers, due process, and equal protection of the laws.‖  R. 
139 (Compl. ¶ 291).  Waterfront alleges that the CRO and the 
CRO Regulations improperly delegate zoning power to the 
Planning Commission, violate equal protection because the 
phrase ―appropriate in scale, density, character and use for the 
surrounding community‖ is ―vague and indefinite,‖ and 
violate substantive due process because they are ―unrelated to 
any legitimate planning purpose.‖  Id. ¶¶ 332-35. 
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Second, in early 2010 the City Council repealed the 
application of any height restrictions to most plots within the 
CRO, including the Site.  See R. 197-98 (Bill No. 100014, 
adding a new subsection (12) to the CRO).  Based on this 
development, the City argued that Waterfront‘s challenge to 
the 65‘ height restriction was moot.  On August 26, 2010, 
after the District Court had permitted the parties to file 
several rounds of briefs on the question of mootness, 
Waterfront moved for leave to further amend its Complaint 
under Rule 15 to ―clarify‖ that it was asserting a challenge to 
the width restriction of the March 2006 Ordinance, as well as 
the height restriction.     
 
C. The District Court’s Rulings  
On March 11, 2011, ruling on the motion, the District 
Court allowed Waterfront to add Count XVI but denied its 
request to include a challenge to the width restriction.  CMR 
D.N. Corp. v. City of Phila., Civil Action No. 07-1045, 2011 
WL 857294, at *1, 6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2011) (―Waterfront 
III‖).  On the same day, the District Court dismissed 
Waterfront‘s constitutional challenges to the March 2006 
Ordinance, reasoning that the rescission of the height 
restriction had mooted Waterfront‘s request for injunctive 
relief and that the claim for damages was ―moot because 
[Waterfront] . . . did not apply for a zoning permit or variance 
from the height restriction. . . .‖  CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of 
Phila., Civil Action No. 07-1045, 2011 WL 857296, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2011) (―Waterfront IV‖). 
 
The City later moved for summary judgment on all 
remaining claims, including the constitutional challenge to 
the CRO and the CRO Regulations and the state law claims of 
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promissory estoppel, detrimental reliance, and unjust 
enrichment.  On November 4, 2011, the District Court 
granted the City‘s motion.  See CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of 
Phila., 829 F. Supp. 2d 290 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (―Waterfront V‖). 
 
III. Analysis 
Waterfront timely appealed the District Court‘s rulings 
in Waterfront III, Waterfront IV, and Waterfront V, but did 
not appeal the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim.  
Waterfront contends that the District Court (1) erred in 
dismissing as moot its contentions that the height restriction 
in the March 2006 Ordinance was facially unconstitutional; 
(2) abused its discretion in denying Waterfront leave to 
amend its Complaint to include the width restriction in its 
challenge to the March 2006 Ordinance; (3) erred in 
concluding that the CRO and the CRO Regulations are 
constitutional; and (4) erred in granting summary judgment to 
the City on the state law claims of promissory estoppel and 
detrimental reliance.  We address each argument in turn. 
 
A. Mootness of the Challenge to the March 2006 
Ordinance 
As previously noted, the City rescinded the application 
of the Old City Overlay‘s 65‘ height restriction to most of the 
lots covered by the CRO, including Waterfront‘s Site.  The 
District Court subsequently held that the rescission mooted 
Waterfront‘s facial claims, including its request for an 
injunction and for compensatory and nominal damages.  See 
Waterfront IV, 2011 WL 857296, at *1, 3-5. 
 
Waterfront no longer contends that its request for 
injunctive relief against the height restriction presents a live 
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controversy.  Accordingly, the sole question on appeal is 
whether the rescission similarly mooted Waterfront‘s request 
for compensatory and nominal damages.  Waterfront also 
seeks declaratory relief.  We review de novo a district court‘s 
determination that claims are moot.  See Ruocchio v. United 
Transp. Union, Local 60, 181 F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 1999).
 
 
 
1. Compensatory Damages 
 The District Court held that Waterfront‘s ―claims for 
damages in connection with its facial constitutional 
challenges are moot‖ because the height restriction was 
rescinded and because Waterfront ―never applied for a zoning 
permit or variance, and the height restriction never was 
enforced as to its project.‖  Waterfront IV, 2011 WL 857296, 
at *5.  The District Court ruled that, as an alternative, the 
claim for damages was speculative, due to the failure to seek 
a permit, and therefore could not proceed.  Id. at *6. 
 
As to the District Court‘s holding that the claim for 
damages was moot, we have stated that ―[d]amages should be 
denied on the merits, not on grounds of mootness.‖  Nat’l 
Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 
1992) (internal citation omitted).  Claims for damages are 
retrospective in nature–they compensate for past harm.  By 
definition, then, such claims ―cannot be moot,‖ Lippoldt v. 
Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006), and ―[a] case is 
saved from mootness if a viable claim for damages exists.‖  
Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citing Nat’l Iranian, 983 F.2d at 489) (emphasis 
added).  Accordingly, we disagree with the District Court‘s 
conclusion that Waterfront‘s claim for damages was moot, 
16 
but nevertheless agree with the District Court that the claim 
for damages cannot proceed, for the reasons that follow.
6
 
 
Pursuant to Khodara, the relevant question is whether 
Waterfront has a viable claim for damages that would save its 
case from mootness—i.e., whether damages are a proper 
remedy for Waterfront‘s claims.  It is black letter law that the 
remedy available to a plaintiff should reflect the right that 
such plaintiff seeks to vindicate.  1 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 
§ 1.7, at 27.  In this case, as we describe below, there is some 
disagreement as to the type of claim Waterfront asserts.  We 
therefore carefully consider different interpretations of the 
claims for which Waterfront seeks damages, and consider 
whether damages are indeed a proper remedy under each 
alternative. 
 
Waterfront seeks damages in connection with Counts I 
and VI of the Complaint, which allege, respectively, that the 
height restriction violates due process because it is ―arbitrary 
and capricious‖ and that it violates equal protection.  The first 
possible interpretation of these counts—the one suggested by 
Waterfront—is that they assert a facial challenge against the 
height restriction.  Indeed, the District Court accepted such 
characterization over the City‘s objections.  See Waterfront I, 
2008 WL 862705, at *7-8.  However, Waterfront‘s arguments 
throughout this litigation have belied its contention that those 
counts constitute a facial challenge.  A party asserting a facial 
challenge ―seeks to vindicate not only his own rights, but 
those of others who may also be adversely impacted by the 
                                              
6
 We may affirm the District Court‘s ruling on alternative 
legal grounds established by the record.  Erie Telecomm., Inc. 
v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir. 1988).   
17 
statute in question.‖  City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 
n.22 (1999).  In a facial challenge, the plaintiff does not seek 
to establish that the law cannot be applied to him; rather, he 
or she must show that ―no set of circumstances exists under 
which the [challenged] Act would be valid.‖  United States v. 
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 405 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).   
 
Waterfront‘s claims do not in any way meet these 
criteria or otherwise resemble a facial challenge.  First, as a 
general matter, Waterfront‘s entire theory of the case is that 
the inclusion of its own Site was a mistake, not that the 
enactment of the ordinance as a whole was a mistake or that 
the height restriction could not be constitutionally applied to 
any property.  Second, neither Count I nor VI alleges that the 
height restriction cannot be constitutionally applied under any 
circumstances.  Instead, those counts refer to the application 
of the height restriction to Waterfront alone.  See, e.g., R. 
113, 120 (Compl. at 28 (requesting declaration that 
Waterfront‘s ―Site is not subject‖ to the March 2006 
Ordinance); ¶ 206 (contending that ―any application‖ of the 
March 2006 Ordinance to ―[Waterfront‘s] Site‖ is 
unconstitutional)).  Third, Waterfront‘s arguments on appeal 
repeat this trend, focusing on the fact that ―the March 2006 
Ordinance prevents [Waterfront] from proceeding lawfully,‖ 
Appellant‘s Br. at 19, and not once explaining why the 
ordinance cannot be constitutionally applied under any 
circumstance.  This pattern persisted at oral argument, where 
Waterfront characterized this case as seeking to vindicate its 
own rights, not the rights of others.  See, e.g., Oral Argument 
at 3:07-3:11 (―our argument focuses on the application of the 
Old City Overlay to our Site‖); 9:15-9:17 (―we challenged the 
application of the Old City Overlay to our project‖); 16:38-
18 
16:55 (―our theory in the complaint always was that we 
wanted the extension of the ordinance stricken as it applied to 
our Site . . . we said this overlay extension shouldn‘t apply to 
our Site.‖), available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/11-
4362CMRD.N.Corpv.CityofPhila.wma.
7
 
 
Our reluctance to recognize Waterfront‘s claims as 
facial challenges is supported by the Supreme Court‘s 
repeated admonitions that facial challenges are disfavored and 
should be considered sparingly.  See, e.g., Wash. State 
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 
(2008).  This is so because facial challenges seek the broad 
remedy of a complete invalidation of a law and because a 
ruling on the constitutionality of all possible applications of a 
statute necessarily ―rest[s] on speculation‖ and invites the 
―premature interpretation of statutes.‖  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).    
 
But even taking Waterfront‘s word that it asserts a 
facial challenge seeking to bar enforcement of the height 
restriction against all possible developers, we agree with the 
City that damages are not available to Waterfront under that 
                                              
7
 The allegations in Counts I and VI of the complaint stand in 
sharp contrast to Count XV of the complaint, where 
Waterfront asserted that the height restriction was 
unconstitutional on its face because it sought to delegate 
zoning power to civic associations.  See id. ¶ 289.  Waterfront 
did not seek damages in connection with Count XV and, in 
any event, damages would not have been a proper remedy for 
that facial attack, for the reasons stated in the following 
paragraphs. 
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theory of the case.  See Appellees‘ Br. at 26, n.4.  When a 
litigant challenges the legality of a zoning law on the theories 
that the law violates equal protection or is arbitrary and 
capricious, for ―a facial challenge, the remedy is the striking 
down of the regulation.  In the case of an as applied 
challenge, the remedy is an injunction preventing the 
unconstitutional application of the regulation to the plaintiff‘s 
property and/or damages . . . .‖  Eide v. Sarasota Cnty., 908 
F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).   This is so 
because, in a facial challenge, ―the claimed constitutional 
violation inheres in the terms of the statute, not its application 
. . . [t]he remedy is necessarily directed at the statute itself 
and must be injunctive and declaratory.‖  Ezell v. City of Chi., 
651 F.3d 684, 698 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (holding 
that damages are not available for a facial challenge to a gun 
control law).  Thus, ―a victory by the plaintiff in [facial 
challenges] normally results in an injunction or a declaratory 
judgment, which serves the broad societal purpose of striking 
an unconstitutional statute from the books,‖ whereas an as-
applied plaintiff ―merely requests monetary damages.‖  
Weissmann v. Fruchtman, 700 F. Supp. 746, 748, 753 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).  Waterfront has cited to no case awarding 
compensatory damages to a plaintiff asserting only a facial 
attack against a zoning law under equal protection or the 
―arbitrary and capricious‖ theory.  Cf. Daskalea v. Wash. 
Humane Soc’y, 710 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting 
that the plaintiffs had not ―cited a single case in which 
monetary damages were awarded in connection with a facial 
due process challenge‖ and holding that such remedy was not 
legally available).  Thus, even if Waterfront‘s claims truly are 
facial attacks, damages are not a proper remedy. 
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The District Court seemed to suggest at times that a 
claim for damages in the context of a facial challenge to a 
zoning law under these theories is, at best, unprecedented.  
See, e.g., Waterfront IV, 2011 WL 857296, at *4.  But the 
Court, and apparently Waterfront, also reasoned that our 
decision in Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism v. City of 
Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007) stands for the 
proposition that, as a general matter, damages are a proper 
remedy for facial challenges.  See Appellant‘s Br. at 27-28.  
In Lighthouse a regulation was challenged on its face as a 
violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act.  We held that repeal of that 
regulation mooted the claim for declaratory relief but 
nonetheless permitted the plaintiff‘s claims for damages to go 
forward.  See id. at 260-61 (citing Donovan v. Punxsutawney 
Area School Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 218 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
Critically, however, Lighthouse and Donovan involved 
challenges under the First Amendment.  ―The courts have 
repeatedly shown solicitude for First Amendment claims . . . 
with regard to facial challenges to a statute.‖  Peachlum v. 
City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 435-36 (3d Cir. 2003).  We show 
this solicitude, and permit damages for facial challenges in 
the First Amendment context, because First Amendment 
rights are ―central to guaranteeing our capacity for democratic 
self-government.‖  Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071, 1072 
(8th Cir. 2000).  These concerns are not present in the context 
of challenges to zoning laws, where we have been careful to 
defer to local governments.  See Pace Res., Inc. v. 
Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1035 (3d Cir. 1987).  Thus, 
Lighthouse does not establish the availability of damages for 
a facial due process challenge to a zoning ordinance.
8
   
                                              
8
 Moreover, in Lighthouse the plaintiff had actually applied 
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Our statement in County Concrete Corporation v. 
Township of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 168 (3d Cir. 2006), that 
―the remedies for a successful substantive due process or 
equal protection claim as to the face of a zoning ordinance are 
the invalidation of the regulation and actual damages,‖ also 
does not establish the availability of damages in this context.  
The theory of liability advanced in County Concrete was that 
the county had enacted a law ―specifically directed‖ or 
―aimed at‖ the plaintiff‘s land.  Id. at 167, 170.  We continue 
to adhere to County Concrete’s conclusion that it ―would be 
an exercise in futility to require appellants to seek a variance 
from an ordinance specifically directed at their properties.‖  
Id. at 167.  But that is not the type of facial challenge that 
Waterfront asserts in this case.  Rather than alleging that 
Waterfront was specifically and unlawfully targeted by the 
March 2006 Ordinance, Waterfront claims that it was 
mistakenly included in the reach of the law.  Waterfront‘s 
theory of the case is thus clearly distinguishable from, and in 
fact is the opposite of, the type of claim asserted in County 
Concrete. 
                                                                                                     
for and was denied a permit under the later-repealed 
ordinance.  See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 259.  The 
compensation permitted in that case was therefore connected 
to a specific application of the ordinance to the plaintiff.  It is 
thus not clear that Lighthouse actually permitted a damages 
claim to go forward in connection with a facial challenge, as 
opposed to an as-applied challenge.  See Tanner Adver. Grp. 
v. Fayette Cnty., 451 F.3d 777, 786 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that plaintiff could not request damages for a facial challenge 
to a zoning ordinance under the First Amendment because the 
provision ―ha[d] not yet harmed‖ the plaintiff). 
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A second alternative to understanding Waterfront‘s 
claims is, as mentioned above, that Counts I and VI truly 
assert as-applied challenges.  So understood, however, those 
counts should have been dismissed for the same reason the 
District Court dismissed Waterfront‘s other constitutional 
claims—because they were unripe under the rules of 
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank and Taylor Investment v. Upper Darby 
Township.  See supra at 8.  In Williamson County, the 
Supreme Court held that claims that a zoning law constituted 
a taking under the Fifth Amendment and went too far by 
depriving plaintiff of all viable use of his or her property, 
were not ripe until the zoning authority had made a ―final 
decision‖ to deny the plaintiff a permit under the law.  473 
U.S. 172, 186-94 (1985).  Ripeness could not occur until the 
plaintiff challenging the ordinance sought and was denied a 
variance or a permit under the ordinance.  Id.  Thereafter, we 
held that Williamson County’s ―finality rule‖ applied to 
challenges to ordinances based both on procedural due 
process or equal protection grounds, and on a theory that a 
regulation violated due process because it was arbitrary and 
capricious.  See Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Phila., 945 
F.2d 667, 686 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying finality rule to 
―arbitrary and capricious‖ theory); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper 
Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 1292-94 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(applying finality rule to procedural due process and equal 
protection challenge).  Because it is undisputed that 
Waterfront never applied for a building permit under the 
March 2006 Ordinance, if the claims for which it seeks 
damages are actually as-applied claims, which we believe 
they are, then such claims are not ripe and cannot proceed.
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As a third and final alternative, Waterfront suggests 
that it asserts a hybrid as-applied/facial challenge to the 
height restriction.  The argument is that the height restriction 
was unconstitutional on its face as applied to Waterfront and 
that Waterfront was harmed by the mere enactment of the 
ordinance.  Waterfront IV, 2011 WL 857296, at *4.   As the 
District Court noted, however, the proper remedy for such a 
claim is an injunction, unless and until the offending law is 
actually applied to the plaintiff.  See id. (citing Daskalea, 710 
F. Supp. 2d at 43).  Indeed, as in Ezell, where the plaintiffs 
sought damages for the mere existence of an ordinance that 
would have required them to travel out of town to obtain a 
gun permit, Waterfront‘s hybrid theory here would be that 
―the City Council violated [the Constitution] by enacting the 
[Ordinance] in the first place.  If [it] prevail[s], the only 
appropriate remedy is a declaration that the [Ordinance] is 
invalid and an injunction forbidding its enforcement.‖  Ezell, 
651 F.3d at 699 n.10 (emphasis in original).  Waterfront cites 
to no case awarding anything other than injunctive relief to a 
plaintiff who asserts that it was harmed by the mere 
enactment of a zoning law, where the plaintiff has not applied 
for a permit.  See also Rumber v. District of Columbia, 595 
F.3d 1298, 1300 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (claim for 
compensatory damages did not save from mootness an action 
to enjoin eminent domain against a property because ―no 
property ha[d] been taken from [the] plaintiffs‖); Angino v. 
Wan Wagner, No. 1:CV-05-1748, 2009 WL 2859041, at *14-
15 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2009) (Vanaskie, J.) (holding that 
damages were not available to a plaintiff who challenged an 
ordinance under a due process theory because the plaintiff 
had not sought a permit and therefore any claim for damages 
was ―purely speculative‖). 
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Limiting the available remedy to an injunction for such 
a claim complements our relaxation of Williamson County’s 
requirement that a zoning authority make a ―final decision‖ 
before a developer may bring suit.  We have held that this 
rule does not apply to facial challenges because it is not 
necessary to advance the rule‘s underlying purpose—to allow 
the court to determine the extent to which a particular 
plaintiff has been harmed by a zoning law.  See Williamson 
Cnty., 473 U.S. at 191, 199-200; see also Taylor, 983 F.2d at 
1291 (finality rule recognizes that the property owner suffers 
no constitutional injury until the zoning authority ―defines the 
harm to the owner‖).  Because the claim in a facial challenge 
is that a law cannot be applied to anyone, there is no need to, 
and no ability to determine the full extent to which any 
particular plaintiff has been harmed.  A district court is 
therefore unable to properly ascertain compensatory damages 
under those circumstances.  Thus, far from being futile, as 
Waterfront suggests, requiring a developer to seek a permit 
even when the law clearly prohibits the construction he or she 
desires, permits the court to rule on an actual, ripe 
controversy.  If, as Waterfront repeatedly contends, the Site 
was included in the ordinance by mistake, the application 
process may well have yielded an exception for Waterfront.  
The rule also permits the court to ascertain the actual extent 
of the harm to the claimant.  On the other hand, little would 
be left of the Williamson County finality rule if we relaxed it 
so that a plaintiff could obtain damages and avoid the 
obligation to seek a permit altogether by artfully pleading its 
case as a ―hybrid facial/as-applied‖ claim as opposed to what 
we believe Waterfront‘s claim really is—an as-applied claim.     
 
In keeping with our obligation to not entertain 
speculative claims, and in the interest of highlighting the 
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importance of the finality rule, we hold that compensatory 
damages are not available to a plaintiff challenging a zoning 
ordinance under the theory that the mere enactment of an 
ordinance harmed such plaintiff, unless the plaintiff applies 
for and is denied a permit under the offending statute.
9
    
 
Our decision does not leave developers in Waterfront‘s 
predicament without a remedy.  Waterfront could have had a 
non-moot claim for money damages had it complied with the 
long-established requirement that it seek a permit or a 
variance before asserting a legal challenge to the ordinance on 
its own behalf.  For unexplained reasons, it chose not to do 
so.  Waterfront instead chose to request that the federal courts 
declare a certain portion of the zoning ordinance 
unconstitutional under all circumstances.  The proper remedy 
had Waterfront been successful would have been to enjoin the 
application of the offending portions of the ordinance, not to 
award money damages.   
 
2. Nominal Damages 
The District Court also concluded that nominal 
damages were unavailable because they would be speculative.  
                                              
9
 The Eleventh Circuit has held that a claim that the mere 
enactment of a statute harms a plaintiff is properly understood 
as an as-applied claim to which the finality rule applies.  See 
Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin Cnty., 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 
(11th Cir. 1991).  Our holding is simply another way of 
saying what the Eleventh Circuit said in Executive 100—to be 
entitled to damages, a plaintiff alleging that it has been 
harmed by the enactment of an ordinance must comply with 
the Williamson County finality rule. 
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See Waterfront IV, 2011 WL 857296, at *6 (citation omitted).  
Waterfront contends that it is entitled to nominal damages 
―for a deprivation of the constitutional right to due process.‖  
Appellant‘s Br. at 31 (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 
112 (1992)).  This argument rests on a misunderstanding of 
nominal damages. 
 
Nominal damages have traditionally ―vindicated 
deprivations of certain ‗absolute‘ rights that are not shown to 
have caused actual injury. . . .‖  Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247, 266 (1978).  The Supreme Court in Carey concluded that 
procedural due process was an ―absolute‖ right the denial of 
which entitled a plaintiff to nominal damages even without 
proof of actual injury.  Id.  In Carey, however, the plaintiffs 
did not bring a facial challenge to a statute.  Instead, the 
plaintiffs challenged an actual deprivation of an entitlement 
pursuant to allegedly faulty adjudicative procedures.  See id. 
at 251 (plaintiffs‘ claims were based on actual ―suspension 
[from school] without any adjudicative hearing of any type‖ 
(citation omitted)).  In other words, the application of 
unconstitutional procedures constitutes an injury in and of 
itself, for which nominal damages are appropriate regardless 
of whether the plaintiff was able to prove an actual injury 
resulting from the deprivation.  The holding of Carey has 
been applied in cases involving the violation of First 
Amendment rights, including situations where a plaintiff‘s 
request for injunctive relief has been mooted because she was 
no longer subject to the offending law.  See, e.g., Corder v. 
Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 
2009) (student plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages 
because her diploma had been withheld in violation of her 
free speech rights).   
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But, like in Carey, the plaintiffs in those cases were 
subjected to actual violations of constitutional rights.  Here, it 
is undisputed that Waterfront never sought and was not 
denied a building permit under the March 2006 Ordinance.  In 
sharp contrast to the plaintiffs in Carey or Corder, who 
suffered a specific deprivation pursuant to the 
unconstitutional statute or procedures, Waterfront was never 
subjected to unconstitutional procedures, wrongfully denied a 
permit under an ordinance that was potentially 
unconstitutional, or otherwise subjected to a constitutional 
deprivation.  The only arguable harm that Waterfront has 
been subjected to is the mere existence of a law that it alleges 
is unconstitutional.  We find no authority, and Waterfront has 
provided none, for the proposition that a plaintiff is entitled to 
nominal damages simply based on the existence of a zoning 
law that has never been applied to it.  That a legislature may 
enact a zoning law that if applied to someone would violate 
due process does not entitle any individual who finds it 
offensive, including those never subjected to the ordinance, to 
nominal damages.
10
 
 
3. Declaratory Relief 
The District Court also dismissed as moot Waterfront‘s 
claim for declaratory relief.  Waterfront contends that a 
declaratory judgment is necessary to ―resolve [its] claim for 
money damages.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 32.  The purpose of a 
                                              
10
 As with respect to actual damages, whether nominal 
damages would be available if a plaintiff was unlawfully and 
selectively targeted by the enactment of a law is not an issue 
in this case.  See Daskalea, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (suggesting 
nominal damages may be available under such a theory).   
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declaratory judgment is to ―declare the rights of litigants.‖  
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995).  The 
remedy is thus by definition prospective in nature.  
Waterfront‘s contention that a declaratory judgment is 
necessary to award damages is therefore incorrect.  As in 
Khodara, here ―a declaration of unconstitutionality or 
injunction directed against the objectionable features‖ of the 
March 2006 Ordinance ―would serve no purpose today.  
Where a law is amended so as to remove its challenged 
features, the claim . . . becomes moot as to those features.‖  
Khodara, 237 F.3d at 194 (internal citations omitted) 
(alteration in original).  Moreover, in light of our conclusion 
that neither injunctive nor monetary relief are available, 
Waterfront‘s request is moot even if a declaratory judgment is 
a necessary precursor to awarding damages. 
 
B. The Motion to Amend the Complaint 
While the mootness question was pending, Waterfront 
pursued an alternative strategy to stave off dismissal.  
Specifically, Waterfront moved under Rule 15 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to ―clarify‖ that its 
complaint also attacked the facial constitutionality of the 
March 2006 Ordinance‘s extension of the 70‘ width 
restriction to the area including the Site.  Waterfront‘s motion 
to amend was filed after the District Court had accepted 
several rounds of briefs from both parties regarding the 
mootness question, as well as after Waterfront‘s motion to 
amend its Complaint to assert claims against the CRO.  The 
District Court denied the motion, reasoning that Waterfront 
had ―engaged in undue delay‖ in asserting a challenge to a 
restriction that had been in existence since the lawsuit was 
filed, and that the proposed change would prejudice the City 
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because it constitutes ―a change to [Waterfront‘s] theory of 
liability.‖  Waterfront III, 2011 WL 857294, at *6 (citations 
omitted).  Waterfront vigorously attacks the District Court‘s 
denial of its motion for leave to amend.  We have considered 
each of Waterfront‘s contentions, and reject them for the 
reasons that follow. 
 
A district court‘s decision to deny a motion for leave 
to amend a complaint under Rule 15(a)(2) is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Estate of Oliva v. New Jersey, 
604 F.3d 788, 803 (3d Cir. 2010).  The motion should be 
granted ―when justice so requires.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  
We are mindful that the pleading philosophy of the Rules 
counsels in favor of liberally permitting amendments to a 
complaint.  Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 
1984).  The motion is nevertheless committed to the ―sound 
discretion of the district court.‖  Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 
Waterfront makes much of our statement that 
―prejudice to the nonmoving party is the touchstone for the 
denial of the amendment.‖  Dole v. Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 
484, 488 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).  Waterfront argues 
that the proposed amendment would not prejudice the City in 
that Waterfront would seek no further discovery with respect 
to the new claim and that the District Court abused its 
discretion because it made no finding that the amendment 
would cause the City discovery-related prejudice.   
 
Waterfront‘s arguments ignore that discovery-related 
prejudice is not the only prejudice that may justify denial of a 
motion for further leave to amend a pleading.  We have also 
explained that a significant, unjustified, or ―undue‖ delay in 
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seeking the amendment may itself constitute prejudice 
sufficient to justify denial of a motion for leave to amend.  
See, e.g., Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273 (―the question of undue 
delay requires that we focus on the movant‘s reasons for not 
amending sooner.‖).  Following this principle, we have 
refused to overturn denials of motions for leave to amend 
where the moving party offered no cogent reason for the 
delay in seeking the amendment.  See, e.g., Oliva, 604 F.3d at 
803 (no justification for a five-year delay); Bjorgung v. 
Whitehall Resort, 550 F.3d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 2008) (no 
explanation for three-year delay); Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273-
74 (no reasons given for two-and-a-half year delay). 
 
Here, Waterfront has proffered no good reason for 
failing to mention the width restriction in any of its court 
filings until late 2010, over three years after it filed its 
original complaint in 2007.  Instead of explaining the delay, 
Waterfront attempts to shift the timeframe of analysis.  It 
argues that it only delayed by five months between when the 
City raised the mootness issue in April of 2010 and when 
Waterfront filed its motion in August of 2010.  Waterfront 
contends that this shift is proper because ―[i]t was not until 
the City sought to dismiss [Waterfront‘s] claims as moot that 
[it] understood the City had overlooked the fact that the 
March 2006 Ordinance imposed a width limit as well as a 
height limit.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 25; see also Appellant‘s 
Reply Br. at 3.  We reject this argument.  For one, it is a 
plaintiff‘s burden to set forth the grounds on which it rests a 
claim for relief.  See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a).  Moreover, if 
there was any oversight as to what portions of the Old City 
Overlay aggrieved Waterfront, it was of its own doing.  
Waterfront has conceded, as it must, that it ―did not 
specifically reference the width limit in its complaint.‖  R. 
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482.  By contrast, the 65‘ height restriction, or height 
restrictions generally, are explicitly mentioned over two 
dozen times.  See, e.g., R. 114-15, 118, 122, 129-38 (Compl. 
¶¶ 172, 174, 180c, 190, 218, 254-55, 267-68, 284-85, 287).  
 
But, even if the timing of the filing of the motion 
should be measured from the time when the City first raised 
the mootness argument, Waterfront delayed filing the motion 
until after it had filed several briefs on the mootness point, 
totaling hundreds of pages, as well as a motion to amend the 
complaint to add the CRO to the case.  None of those filings, 
which occupied the District Court‘s time over the course of 
several months, mentioned the width restriction.  We consider 
this sequence of events to be an ―unwarranted burden on the 
court‖ that also counsels against granting Waterfront‘s 
request for an additional amendment.  Cureton, 252 F.3d at 
273 (citation omitted). 
 
Moreover, the District Court correctly determined that 
the City would be prejudiced because the proposed 
amendment would bring a new theory into the case several 
years after the beginning of the litigation.  Waterfront 
contends that the addition of the width restriction does not 
constitute a new theory of liability because the complaint 
―sought relief against the March 2006 Ordinance as a whole.‖  
Appellant‘s Br. at 21.  It is true that Waterfront‘s complaint 
mentioned the March 2006 Ordinance more generally on 
occasion, but, as mentioned, the complaint is replete with 
specific mentions of the height restriction and not any 
mention of the width issue.    
 
Finally, Waterfront contends that the addition of the 
width restriction would not constitute a new theory because 
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the width restriction is a ―de facto ‗height‘ restriction that 
prevents [Waterfront‘s] high-rise project.‖  Appellant‘s Reply 
Br. at 1, 7.  This argument begs the question of why, if it was 
so obvious that the width restriction was a problem, 
Waterfront never mentioned it explicitly at least once in its 
several complaints.
11
 
 
While we are cognizant of the liberal amendment 
policy of the Rules, it is also true that they give district courts 
discretion to deny a motion in order to forestall strategies that 
are ―contrary to both the general spirit of the federal rules and 
the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a).‖  6 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & 
RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1488, at 814 (1984) (Supp. 2012).  We find no reason for 
Waterfront‘s failure to mention the width restriction until 
2010, other than because the motion was simply an attempt to 
avoid dismissal due to mootness.  Like in Cureton, the 
District Court here ―had considerable familiarity with the 
development of the factual and legal issues‖ and ―carefully 
analyzed plaintiffs‘ proffered reasons for delay, the prejudice 
to [the defendant], and the substance of the amended 
complaint.‖  Cureton, 252 F.3d at 274.  We therefore 
conclude that the District Court conscientiously applied the 
                                              
11
 Waterfront‘s argument that the width restriction was 
supposedly mentioned at depositions does not change this 
conclusion.  The proper focus of the inquiry is whether 
Waterfront raised the argument in its pleadings or other 
filings in court, not whether an attorney at an open-ended 
deposition asked one question.   
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principles embodied by the Rules, and did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Waterfront‘s motion to further amend.12 
 
C. The Constitutional Challenge to the CRO 
and CRO Regulations 
The District Court did permit Waterfront to amend its 
complaint to allege that the CRO and CRO Regulations were 
unconstitutionally vague and violated due process because 
they unlawfully delegated zoning power to the Planning 
Commission.  On November 4, 2011, however, the court 
granted the City‘s motion for summary judgment on both 
theories, which Waterfront now challenges on appeal.  We 
address each contention separately below, reviewing de novo 
rulings regarding the constitutionality of a statute.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2008).
 
 
 
1. The CRO is not Unconstitutionally 
Vague 
Waterfront‘s principal theory is that the CRO and the 
CRO Regulations violate due process on their face because 
they leave undefined the phrase ―development appropriate in 
scale, density, character and use for the surrounding 
community.‖  FORMER PHILA. CODE § 14-1638(12) (2009).  
Waterfront contends that because that phrase is vague, it 
cannot comply with the CRO‘s requirement to submit a plan 
                                              
12
 Following oral argument, the parties informed us that the 
width restriction has also been rescinded.  See PHILADELPHIA, 
PA. ZONING CODE §§ 14-502, 14-507 (2012).  Thus 
Waterfront‘s attempt to amend the complaint is now futile as 
well.   
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of development that meets those characteristics.  See 
Appellant‘s Br. 34-39.13 
 
The Supreme Court has explained that laws must not 
fail to ―give [a] person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited. . . .‖  Vill. of Hoffman 
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 
(1982) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108-09 (1972)).  To succeed on a facial vagueness challenge, 
the plaintiff must ―demonstrate that the law is impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications.‖  Id. at 498.  Importantly, 
―economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test‖ 
than criminal laws because businesses ―may have the ability 
to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry.‖  
Id. at 498-99.  In determining whether a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague, we look to the law as a whole to 
determine whether a person of ordinary intelligence may be 
able to ascertain the meaning of the challenged terms.  See 
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110.  That an ordinance may contain 
some ambiguities does not render it impermissibly vague.  
Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 502 (upholding 
ordinance that did ―contain ambiguities‖).  Thus, to find an 
                                              
13
 It is unclear whether the vagueness argument asserts a due 
process or an equal protection challenge.  Compare 
Appellant‘s Br. at 34-39 (using due process language) with id. 
at 40-42 (citing Taylor v. Moore, 154 A. 799 (Pa. 1931) for 
the proposition that the alleged vagueness offends equal 
protection principles); cf. Waterfront V, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 
303-04 (couching vagueness argument as equal protection 
claim).  Because we conclude that the CRO and the CRO 
Regulations are not unconstitutionally vague, Waterfront‘s 
argument fails under either theory. 
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economic civil statute void for vagueness, it must be so vague 
as to be ―no rule or standard at all.‖  Boutilier v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).   
 
Guided by these principles, it is clear from the entirety 
of the CRO and the CRO Regulations that they do not provide 
―no standard at all.‖  First, the words on which Waterfront 
focuses, ―surrounding community,‖ have clear, ascertainable 
meanings.  It is undisputed that the geographical reach of the 
CRO is clearly defined and unambiguous.  See FORMER 
PHILA. CODE § 14-1638(3) (2009).  Thus, there is no 
confusion as to the geographical scope of the statute, which 
logically informs the use of the word ―community‖ in the law.  
Moreover, the word ―surrounding‖ in this context has an 
easily ascertainable meaning: ―being the environment or 
adjacent areas,‖ RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER‘S DICTIONARY at 
1916 (2d Ed. 1999).  Thus, a developer need only look at 
other structures in the immediate vicinity of a proposed 
project to determine whether it is similar to existing 
constructions in ―scale, density, character or use,‖ words 
which Waterfront does not and cannot contend are 
ambiguous.  FORMER PHILA. CODE § 14-1638(12) (2009).  If 
a developer of reasonable intelligence faces a close call after 
analyzing the constructions in the district, it can apply for a 
permit to eliminate any remaining ambiguity.  This is 
sufficient to comply with constitutional requirements.  See 
Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99. 
 
We find further support for our conclusion in decisions 
of our sister Circuits regarding similarly-worded zoning 
ordinances.  In Mayes v. City of Dallas, 747 F.2d 323 (5th 
Cir. 1984), the court held that an ordinance which required 
certain aspects of new buildings to ―harmonize‖ with the 
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―overall character‖ of a district, or with certain ―surrounding 
structures,‖ did not unlawfully fail to set forth ―objective, 
articulated standards sufficient to prevent the arbitrary 
exercise of government power.‖  Mayes, 747 F.3d at 324-25.  
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has held that an ordinance 
requiring projects to be ―compatible‖ with and to ―preserve 
the rural character of the . . . agricultural community,‖ is not 
unconstitutionally vague, noting that the term ―compatible‖ 
had only one logical meaning.  Henry v. Jefferson Cnty. 
Planning Comm’n, 215 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. June 9, 2000) 
(table opinion).  In doing so, the court also noted that specific 
provisions of the ordinance, as well as its stated legislative 
purposes, provided builders with ―sufficient notice and 
warning as to what requirements [they] must meet in order to 
obtain‖ a building permit.  Id. 
 
Indeed, as in Henry, many provisions of this statute go 
a long way toward eliminating ambiguity (if any exists at all) 
in the words ―surrounding community.‖  The CRO has a 
stated legislative purpose, which is to permit construction in 
the district pursuant to the guidelines set forth in the Civic 
Vision while a more comprehensive plan for the improvement 
of the district is developed.  Id. § 14-1638(1)(h).  And, as 
catalogued above, both the CRO and the CRO Regulations 
contain a long list of prohibited and permitted uses for lots 
within the area they cover, and specify detailed requirements 
for new constructions.  See, e.g., id. §§ 14-1638(4)-(9).  These 
provisions thus narrow the universe of structures a potential 
builder could consider in determining whether a project 
would pass muster under the CRO.  Finally, the CRO 
Regulations list seven specific factors that the Planning 
Commission must consider in evaluating a proposed plan of 
development, directing the Planning Commission‘s review of 
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proposed plans submitted under the CRO and thereby further 
alleviating any remaining ambiguities.  See Maher v. City of 
New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975) (―To 
satisfy due process, guidelines to aid a commission charged 
with implementing a public zoning purpose need not be so 
rigidly drawn as to prejudge the outcome in each case, 
precluding reasonable administrative discretion‖).   
 
2. The CRO does not Unlawfully Delegate 
Authority to the Planning Commission 
Waterfront also contends that the CRO and the CRO 
Regulations violate substantive due process because they 
irrationally permit the Planning Commission to ―control the 
issuing of zoning permits on the basis of the Civic Vision and 
the Master Plan instead of the existing zoning,‖ and because 
such delegation of power is unlawful under the Philadelphia 
Home Rule Charter.  Appellant‘s Br. at 43. 
 
Waterfront‘s irrationality argument ignores our 
repeated admonitions that we: 
 
largely defer to legislative judgment on such 
matters as zoning regulation because of the 
recognition that the process of democratic 
political decisionmaking often entails the 
accommodation of competing interests, and thus 
necessarily produces laws that burden some 
groups and not others.  This court will not 
substitute its judgment about land use policy 
and thereby undermine the legitimacy of 
democratic decisionmaking unless the local 
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legislative judgment is without a plausible 
rational basis.    
Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1035 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Waterfront posits that it was irrational to delegate zoning 
power to implement the Civic Vision, a document that 
Waterfront contends was designed to outline zoning goals and 
not to carry the force of law.  Even accepting Waterfront‘s 
dubious characterizations of the effect of the CRO, we fail to 
see anything irrational in deciding to enact into law a zoning 
document approved by the Planning Commission, the very 
agency entrusted to advise the City on zoning matters, simply 
because the document was originally conceived as providing 
aspirational, non-binding goals.  Nor can Waterfront seriously 
contend that the City Council may not rationally conclude 
that such an entity should have a say in the approval of 
specific projects, given that the entity is specifically required 
by the City Charter to advise the City Council on zoning 
matters.  See 351 PA. CODE §§ 4.4-601, 4.4-604. 
 
Waterfront‘s argument that the CRO is an unlawful 
delegation of power to the Planning Commission also fails.  A 
violation of state laws governing the allocation of power 
between local entities does not, without more, establish a 
federal substantive due process violation.  See, e.g., Baker v. 
Coxe, 230 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 2000).
14
   
                                              
14
 Moreover, although it is true that the Philadelphia Charter 
gives the Licensing Department the express power to issue 
building permits, it also permits the City Council to add new 
powers and duties to agencies if not otherwise inconsistent 
with the Charter.  See 351 PA. CODE § 2.2-305.  Thus, any 
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We conclude that the CRO and the CRO Regulations 
are not unconstitutionally vague, and that any delegation of 
zoning authority to the Planning Commission by the CRO 
does not violate the due process clause.  Summary judgment 
on Waterfront‘s claims against the CRO and the CRO 
Regulations was proper. 
 
D. The Promissory Estoppel and Detrimental 
Reliance Claims 
Finally, Waterfront asserts state law claims of 
promissory estoppel and detrimental reliance.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment to the City against these 
claims, Waterfront V, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 304-05, a ruling we 
review de novo, applying the same legal standard applied by 
the District Court.  Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 
584 F.3d 575, 580-81 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is 
only appropriate if, after reviewing the record in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, it is apparent that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any fact material to the legal 
claims at issue in the case.  Id. at 581.  Whether a disputed 
fact is material depends on the elements of the cause of action 
on which the claim for relief is based.  For Waterfront to 
prevail under these state law theories, it must establish that 
(1) the City made a promise it ―reasonably expect[ed] to 
induce action or forbearance by [Waterfront], (2) the promise 
does induce action or forbearance by [Waterfront], (3) and 
injustice can only be avoided by enforcing the promise.‖  
                                                                                                     
delegation of zoning or permit-issuing power to the Planning 
Commission, if the CRO can even be fairly characterized as 
such, is permitted by Philadelphia‘s laws. 
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Carlson v. Arnot-Ogden Mem’l Hosp., 918 F.2d 411, 416 (3d 
Cir.1990) (citation omitted).
15
   
 
The District Court concluded that Waterfront failed to 
satisfy the first element because there was insufficient 
evidence that the City had made a ―valid and enforceable 
promise‖ to Waterfront.  See Waterfront V, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 
304-05.  Waterfront posits that this was error because under 
Pennsylvania law a specific promise is not required, but 
rather ―[r]epresentations made to the plaintiff‖ are sufficient.  
Appellant‘s Br. at 49.  But it is a basic tenet of contract law 
that ―mere expression[s] of intention, hope, desire, or opinion, 
which shows no real commitment, cannot be expected to 
induce reliance.‖  3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.9, at 29-30 
(Rev. Ed. 1996); see also C&K Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. 
Equibank, 839 F.2d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 1989) (refusing to 
permit an action for detrimental reliance based on a ―broad 
and vague implied promise‖).   
 
Here, the totality of the relevant facts reveals at most 
that the City and certain of its entities supported Waterfront‘s 
pursuit of the World Trade Center project at various times.  
For example, the City supported the Project by 
recommending Waterfront to receive a World Trade Center 
license, by participating in the feasibility study committee, 
and by brokering or supporting negotiations between 
Waterfront and civic associations.  See supra at 3-5.  The 
record also shows that City officials made statements in 
                                              
15
 Promissory estoppel and detrimental reliance claims are 
treated interchangeably by Pennsylvania courts.  See, e.g., 
Rinehimer v. Luzerne Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 539 A.2d 1298, 1306 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
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support of Waterfront‘s partnership with the Port Authority 
(but it is undisputed that the City was not a party to this 
agreement), and it is also true that the City included 
Waterfront‘s Site in a request to receive from the 
Commonwealth tax-preferred status for certain 
neighborhoods in the City.  Finally, the record shows that 
certain City agencies were aware of the importance to 
Waterfront of maintaining restriction-free zoning status.  See, 
e.g., R. 724 (presentation by Waterfront to the Licensing 
Department in February of 2002 explaining that continuous 
C-4 zoning was important for the Project).  None of these 
facts, however, can fairly be interpreted as the type of 
representation by the City that would be sufficient to bind it 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, and Waterfront has 
not otherwise pointed to any commitment of any type by City 
officials, let alone statements that the City was committed to 
adhering to its present intentions indefinitely. 
 
Moreover, the cases cited by Waterfront in support of 
its position are distinguishable.  See Bootel v. Verizon 
Directories Corp., No. Civ. A. 03-1997, 2004 WL 1535798, 
*9-10 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2004) (involving an affirmative 
representation to a plaintiff that she could rely on a written 
policy as if it were a binding contract); Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. 
Am. Ash Recycling Corp., 895 A.2d 595, 605-06 (Pa. Super. 
2006) (involving affirmative representations about the quality 
of a product on which a third party relied to pursue a project).  
Neither case stands for the proposition that a court will 
transform representations about present intentions into 
binding promises of future action. 
 
We recognize, as the District Court did, that the 
―promise‖ sufficient to support an estoppel claim can take 
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different forms under Pennsylvania law.  See Waterfront V, 
829 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (collecting cases).  However, we think 
that an important principle of contract law is controlling here:  
whether a plaintiff‘s actions constitute ―a sufficient promise 
to invoke the doctrine . . . is a question ultimately of the 
objective reasonableness of any reliance.‖  CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 8.12, at 176 (analyzing Pennsylvania law).  
Waterfront is a sophisticated, experienced developer.  If it 
interpreted any of the encouragement by the City as a promise 
of perpetual support for the Project, any subsequent reliance 
based on such interpretation was unreasonable and, therefore, 
not actionable. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Waterfront‘s constitutional challenge to the height 
restriction imposed by the March 2006 Ordinance was 
properly dismissed.  Waterfront asserted a facial challenge 
against the 65 feet height restriction imposed by that 
ordinance.  When the City rescinded that restriction, 
Waterfront obtained exactly the type of relief it sought and, 
therefore, it no longer had a claim for prospective relief.  The 
remedies of compensatory or nominal damages are not 
available when a facial attack on a zoning ordinance rests on 
either a theory that the law violated equal protection or was 
arbitrary and capricious, or that the plaintiff was harmed by 
the mere enactment of the restriction. 
 
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in 
refusing to allow Waterfront a further amendment to its 
complaint.  The gravamen of Waterfront‘s claim is that the 
height restriction was unconstitutional, and it had years to 
explicitly mention that it also challenged the width restriction.  
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It did not do so until the eleventh hour, without offering any 
cogent explanation for this delay.  Under these circumstances, 
it was well within the District Court‘s discretion to refuse to 
permit further amendments. 
 
Finally, the District Court correctly concluded that the 
Central Delaware Riverfront Overlay was not 
unconstitutionally vague and did not violate substantive due 
process, and that Waterfront had offered no evidence on 
which to base a claim for promissory estoppel or detrimental 
reliance. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‘s judgment. 
